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Introduction
In a nation the size of the United States, there are competing interests of virtually every 
degree in our day-to-day lives.  Once in a while we come to an intersection of major concerns 
that create a potential for great damage, either to individuals or to the general good of the whole.  
When we reach these intersections it is imperative that we proceed with great care to avoid injury 
if at all possible, and if not, that we minimize the injury to the greatest extent wisdom allows.
Recently the courts have encountered such an intersection in challenges to the Solomon 
Amendment.  At the crossroads of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause and the 
cherished freedoms of speech provided by the First Amendment lies the prickly ground of the 
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions.  This crossroads is being navigated by the courts today.
This comment reviews the Solomon Amendment, its purpose and history.  The challenges to 
the law have resulted in contentious litigation, but not unlike challenges the courts have faced in 
the past.  After reviewing the past, this comment review the bases for each of the challenges in 
the current litigation and discuss the similarities of the several challenges.  The analysis that 
follows discusses a single case as the flagship challenge and suggests that there is unlikely to be 
any major shift in the statutory direction of Congress.  Finally, this comment looks beyond a 
final decision to the options available to the parties involved.
The Solomon Amendment
The Solomon Amendment, named for Representative Gerald Solomon of New York, was 
introduced in the House of Representatives during the second session of the 103d Congress.1
1
 140 Cong. Rec. H3860-03, H3861.
2The bill amended the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.2  The purpose of 
the National Defense Authorization Act is to set military personnel strength and fund the budget 
requirements of the Department of Defense.  The language of Representative Solomon’s original 
amendment required that no funds would be made available to any educational institution 
through a Department of Defense contract or grant.3
The legislation ensured that federal funding, through the Department of Defense and in 
support of educational institutions, was not spent in places where military recruiters were not 
allowed on campus.  The bill’s sponsor, Representative Solomon, expressed his frustration with 
schools that accepted federal money but denied recruiters the opportunity to “explain[] the 
benefits of an honorable career in our military.”4  The amendment withheld Department of 
Defense funding provided “by grant or contract to any educational institution”5 that prevented 
on-campus military recruitment by the Department of Defense.6
The Solomon Amendment passed through the House by a little better than a two-to-one 
vote.7  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 was passed by the Senate 
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6
 The original text of Mr. Solomon’s amendment, entitled “Military Recruiting On Campus” is included here for 
reference.  (a) Denial of Funds. (1) No funds available to the Department of Defense may be provided by grant or 
contract to any educational institution that has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the Secretary of 
Defense from obtaining for military purposes – (A) entry to campuses or access to students on campuses; or (B) 
access to directory information pertaining to students.  (2) Students referred to in paragraph (1) are individuals who 
are 17 years of age or older.  (b) Procedures for Determination.  The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Education, shall prescribe regulations that contain procedures for determining if and when an 
educational institution has denied or prevented access to students or information described in subsection (a).  (c) 
Definition.  For purposes of this section, the term “directory information” means, with respect to a student, the 
student’s name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, level of education, degrees received, and the most 
recent previous educational institution enrolled in by the student.  140 Cong. Rec. H3860-03, H3861.
7
 140 Cong. Rec. H3860-03, H3865 (ayes – 271 to noes – 126).
3and enacted as law a few months later.8  Since its debate in the House and subsequent enactment, 
the Solomon Amendment has come under attack.9
The amendment was offered by Representative Gerald Solomon, a Republican congressman 
from New York.  Representative Solomon was a known supporter of the military, having served 
in the United States Marine Corps.10  Though not the only member of Congress who might have 
sponsored this legislation, his role in its introduction to the House seems a natural extension of 
his work in Congress.11  There does not seem to be any particular event that sparked Rep. 
Solomon to action; “[t]he apparent impetus for the Solomon Amendment was the continued 
refusal of many educational institutions to allow the military to engage in on-campus 
recruiting.”12
There have been several changes in the language of the amendment.  “In 1997 Congress 
amended the Solomon Amendment by expanding its penalty to include”13 four additional 
departments beyond Defense,14 but the premise of the law has not been lost to Congress.15
8
 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337 § 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2004)).
9
 140 Cong. Rec. H 3860-03, 3861-3865.  Representatives McNulty (NY), Dellums (Calif.), Unsoeld (Wash.), 
Schroeder (Colo.) and Mr. Underwood (Guam) all rose in opposition to the amendment.  Representatives Dellums 
and Schroeder purported to speak for the Department of Defense, the American Bar Association, and numerous 
educational associations opposed to the amendment.
10
 Will Dunham, Former Rep. Solomon, Ardent Conservative, Dies, at
http://slick.org/deathwatch/mailarchive/msg00372.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
11 Id.  Mr. Dunham, in writing Rep. Solomon’s obituary, notes that Solomon was “known as a committed 
Republican and aggressive conservative” and “was the chief sponsor of an unsuccessful amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution to prohibit the burning of the American flag.”
12
 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 278 (D.N.J. 2003).  During 
the floor debate on his amendment, Rep. Solomon stated, “During the recent congressional hearings, Congress has 
been made aware that military recruiters are being denied access to educational facilities . . .”  140 Cong. Rec. 
H3860-03, H3861.
13 Id. at 226.
14 Id. (including Departments of Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education).
15
 151 Cong. Rec. H317-04 (the House voted overwhelmingly to reaffirm its support for the Solomon Amendment, 
passing House Concurrent Resolution 36, “Expressing Continued Support of Congress for Equal Access of Military 
Recruiters to Institutions of Higher Education” on February 2, 2005).
4Through the previous decade, and especially with President Clinton’s entry to the White 
House, there grew an ever increasing animosity between homosexual special interests and the 
military over the Defense Department’s policies dealing with homosexual conduct and stated 
same-sex preferences for members in uniform.
During this period, the United States was involved in military conflict in Africa, South 
America, and Europe.  At the same time, the military was reducing its size at the conclusion of 
the Cold War.  Even though there were reductions in progress, there continued a need to recruit 
new personnel to meet the future needs of the military and to replace the many service members 
who were taking the opportunity to retire early or enter into civilian careers.  Clinton, having 
come into office in 1992, had made an effort to fulfill a campaign promise to allow homosexuals 
to serve in the military.  The President and his senior military advisors came to a compromise 
policy, now known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” standard.  The compromise did not create a 
new era of open accession into the military for homosexuals, but it did allow homosexuals who 
were in the military to remain and those who were willing to keep their preferences to 
themselves the opportunity to enter and serve in uniform.
The military policy did not comport with the non-discrimination policies of many colleges 
and universities around the country.  Through the 1980s, many schools had adopted policies 
which limited employers who were allowed to recruit on campus.
A. Rules Implicated at a Legal Intersection
1. Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause
The Constitution expressly gives Congress the right and the duty to collect taxes and spend 
those proceeds for the general welfare of the country.16  Congress’ spending power is well-
16
 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
5established.  The Supreme Court has held Congress has wide latitude under the spending clause 
to use funding to encourage compliance with its policy preferences.17  There are limitations to 
Congress’ power18 but its broad power to spend has fewer restrictions than its ability to directly 
regulate activity through legislation.19  As examples, Congress may not require that states raise 
the minimum drinking age but may condition highway funding on state legislation that raises the 
age to twenty-one.20  Nor may Congress require that libraries install filters on internet computers 
open to the public, but Congress may withhold internet and computer funding from libraries that 
do not install those filters.21
The Constitution provides, even requires, that Congress is responsible for both the common 
defense and the general welfare of the nation.  The general welfare can be provided for by 
regulating the actions of other governmental actors, the creation and operation of governmental 
agencies, or the direct funding of public needs.  The last option, essentially the redistribution of 
wealth, results in the greatest surrender of Congressional control over the use of funds.  The 
control of those funds is retained when Congress can refuse to continue funding if the recipient 
does not comply with Congress’ purposes in providing the funding.
2. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions is related to the spending clause.  This doctrine 
provides that Congress may not withhold funding based on conditions that require the recipient 
to give up some other guaranteed right.22  This doctrine limits Congress’ ability under the 
17
 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
18 Id. at 207-08.
19 Id. at 209.
20 See id.
21 See U.S. v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
22 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
6spending clause to induce compliance from a recipient.  There must already be some right to 
receive the funding.  Examples here might be that Congress cannot condition veteran’s tax 
benefits on the recipient’s taking a loyalty oath.23  Nor may Congress condition federal funding 
to broadcasting stations on the stations’ restraint from editorializing.24
3. First Amendment Rights of Free Speech and Association
The right of free speech is one of the most cherished constitutional guarantees enjoyed by 
Americans.  The right of free speech is not unlimited, but several types of expression are 
protected.  Political speech is protected where the speaker wishes to positively express him or 
herself.25  The reverse of that positive expression is also protected in that a speaker cannot be 
compelled to speak for another; in particular, the government may not compel a speaker.26
Related to the right of free speech is the right to associate with others and thereby express some 
common opinion.27  The right of association does not require that a group express itself, only that 
it have the opportunity to do so.28  The violation of these rights is subject to a standard of strict 
scrutiny.29
II. Solomon Amendment Litigation
1. Background Litigation
As part of the background for the Solomon Amendment, there were several cases that may 
have had some influence on Representative Solomon.  The suits which follow, suits against law 
23 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
24 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
25
 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
26 Id.
27
 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000).
28 Id.
29
 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 179 (free speech) and 187 (association) (2005).
7schools and the government that seek to deny military recruiters any presence on college 
campuses, illustrate the issues that likely frustrated Rep. Solomon.
In United States v. City of Philadelphia,30 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a 
lower court’s summary judgment, limiting a local order that prohibited Temple University Law 
School from supporting military recruitment.31  Several students and a student organization 
brought a complaint to the city human resources office alleging violations of the city’s fair 
employment ordinances.32  The plaintiffs argued that because the military discriminated against 
homosexuals, the law school had violated fair employment opportunities by allowing military 
recruiters to exclude from interviews any gay and lesbian students.  The city’s Commission on 
Human Relations entered an order against Temple University Law School, disallowing military 
recruiters on-campus.33  The military brought suit, joined by the law school, to avoid the order as 
a violation of the Supremacy Clause.34  The circuit court held the city ordinance was in conflict 
with Congressional policy and could not be permitted to restrict military recruitment.35  The 
federal law preempted the local ordinance only because the two were not compatible, not 
because Congress had moved to supplant state law.36  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
returned to and distinguished this decision in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 
v. Rumsfeld, discussed below in this comment.37
30
 U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).
31 Id. at 91.
32 Id. at 84.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 85.
35 City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 88-89.
36 Id. at 86 n.5.
37 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 234 n.15 (distinguished from City of Philadelphia because the law school in City of 
Philadelphia had invited the military as opposed to having the military recruiters imposed upon the school in FAIR
and because there was no preemption question in FAIR).
8Shortly before the Solomon Amendment was first enacted, the Federal District Court for the 
District of Minnesota held that recruitment was commercial speech that could be restricted in 
Nomi v. Regents for the University of Minnesota.38  Plaintiff, Brian Nomi, was a student who 
sued the University of Minnesota Law School seeking an injunction against the school’s non-
discrimination policy.39  Nomi argued that the school’s policy was an unconstitutional limit on 
his First Amendment right to hear the recruitment message of the U.S. military or the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.40  The defendant characterized the recruitment message as commercial 
speech that could be restricted by the state where there was an important governmental interest.41
The court agreed first that recruitment speech was commercial speech, “speech proposing a 
commercial transaction.”42  The court also agreed that the interest of the school in promoting 
equal opportunity was a sufficiently important governmental interest.43  The court allowed the 
law school to keep its non-discrimination policy and Nomi’s appeal was vacated as moot because
he had graduated by the time the court of appeals heard his case.44
In Gay and Lesbian Law Students Association (GLLSA) v. Board of Trustees,45 the law 
school faculty, certain students, and a student organization sued the University of Connecticut 
for violations of state law that protected sexual orientation.46  In 1991 the Connecticut legislature 
38 Nomi v. Regents for the University of Minnesota, 796 F. Supp. 412 (Minn. 1992) vacated as moot, 5 F.3d 332 (8th 
Cir. 1993). 
39 Id. at 415.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 416.
42 Id. at 417.
43 Id. at 419, applying the four-part test described in Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980).
44 Nomi v. Regents for the University of Minnesota, 5 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 1993).
45
 Gay and Lesbian Law Students Association v. Board of Trustees, 673 A.2d 484 (Conn. 1996).
46 Id. at 486.
9passed a Gay Rights Law.47  The Connecticut law prohibited state entities from discriminating on 
the basis of sexual orientation and specifically prohibited such discrimination by “placement 
services provided by state agencies.”48  The legislature included “educational institutions, which 
provide employment referrals or placement services.”49  The Gay Rights Law excepted from its 
prohibitions the conduct and administration of Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs on 
college campuses.50  The Connecticut Supreme Court made clear, however, that the state law 
would not require any greater assistance to the military than provided other discriminatory 
employers.51  The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the state law and affirmed a permanent 
injunction against the university, prohibiting military recruiters from using the law school’s 
career placement services.52
These three cases highlight the trend against military recruitment on law school campuses.  
The non-discrimination policies of the nation’s law schools, which began in the late 1970s,53
began to set an unwelcome tone for the U.S. military through the 1980s.  By the time the 
Solomon Amendment was proposed, the military was enduring many stresses through the early 
1990s.  These stresses included the draw down of troops at the close of the Cold War coupled 
with increasing overseas military commitments such as the Gulf War in Iraq and peacekeeping 
47
 46a C.G.S. § 46a-81a (2005).
48
 46a C.G.S. § 46a-81j, “Sexual orientation discrimination: Job recruitment and placement services provided by 
state agencies.”
49
 46a C.G.S. § 46a-81j(a) (2005).
50
 46a C.G.S. § 46a-81q (2005).
51 GLLSA, 673 A.2d at 499.  The defendant argued that Connecticut law required military recruiters must be allowed 
access to on-campus recruiting according to 10a C.G.S. § 10a-149a, “Military recruiters; access to directory 
information and on-campus recruiting.”  That law was in force before the Gay Rights law was adopted, but was 
subsequently repealed in 1997 and replaced by § 10a-149c which only required that military access to school 
directories was only required from state schools to the extent required to keep the school in compliance with federal 
law and to prevent the loss of federal funding.
52 Id. at 499.
53 See infra, note 55 (late 1970s).
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efforts in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Given the accompanying budget difficulties the 
federal government was working through, it is not surprising that Representative Solomon might 
have been frustrated by impediments to military recruiting being erected by certain institutions of 
higher learning.
2. Current Litigation
This series of cases, primarily in the northeast United States, attack the Solomon Amendment 
as unconstitutional.  The cases, all in federal court,54 follow a similar line of arguments.  The 
plaintiffs in these cases variously represent law school faculties, law school students, student 
organizations, and national law school organizations.  The claims of these plaintiffs center on 
non-discrimination policies that have been in place since the late 1970s.55  The non-
discrimination policies include sexual orientation as a protected class.56  In each case, the non-
discrimination policies applied to the law school’s career placement service.57  The career 
placement service or office at each school required potential employers to sign an assurance to 
the school that the employer did not discriminate in any way which violated the school’s non-
54
 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004); Burt v. Rumsfeld 2005 
WL 273205 (D. Conn. 2005); Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004); 
Burbank v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 1925532 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
55 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 224; Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
56 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2; see also Gay and 
Lesbian Law Students Association (GLLSA) v. Bd. of Trustees, 673 A.2d 484, 487 (Conn. 1996) (claiming a 
violation of state law).  The American Association of Law Schools (AALS), a non-profit association of law schools 
voted in 1990 “to include sexual orientation as a protected category in law school non-discrimination policies.” 
FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
Most law schools have an office of career placement service whose job it is to help students and graduates 
locate employment and to help employers find and hire students and graduates from the school.  Other services 
offered include skill training for job interviews, resume writing, and other job counseling for the students.
57 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2; see also GLLSA, 
673 A.2d at 487.  The AALS policy also directed career placement services should not be made available to 
noncompliant employers.  FAIR, 390 F.3d at 225.
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discrimination policy.58  If an employer could not or would not sign the assurance, the law school 
refused to allow that employer access to the career placement facilities.59  Congress directed that 
Department of Defense policy should not allow homosexuals to serve if they acknowledge their 
sexual orientation or commit homosexual acts.60  Military recruiters were unable to comply with 
the law school non-discrimination policies as a result.61  In an effort to preserve the consistency 
of their non-discrimination policies, the law school faculty, students, and organizations in these 
cases sought to prevent the military from participating in on-campus recruiting efforts.62
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld
The first of the four federal cases is styled Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 
v. Rumsfeld (FAIR).63  In September, 2003, a group of law school faculty organizations and 
students came together as groups and individually to challenge the United States’ military’s 
application of the Solomon Amendment.  The District Court faced two issues; first whether the 
plaintiffs had legal standing and second, whether the plaintiffs’ motion for injunction had 
“established a likelihood of success on the merits.”64
58 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2.  Contra GLLSA, 
673 A.2d at 487 (quoting in footnote 4, stipulated fact 9., the specific exception for written certification from 
military recruiters).  The AALS policy directed career placement services to obtain “written assurance” of 
compliance from employers.  FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 280-81.
59 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2 (military directed to 
the Univ. of Pa. Office of Career Services, rather than using the law school Career Planning and Placement Office); 
see also GLLSA, 673 A.2d at 487 (quoting in footnote 4, stipulated fact 9., that written certification was required 
before interviews were allowed).
60
 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
61 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 193; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390; Burbank 2004 WL 1925532 at 2; see also GLLSA, 
673 A.2d at 487 (quoting in footnote 4, stipulated fact 11., allowing the military to amend or omit the law school 
non-discrimination certification).
62 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231; FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 281-82; Burt, 2005 WL 273205 at 1; Burt, 322 F. Supp.2d at 
198; SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94; Burbank, 2004 WL 1925532 at 3.
63 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003).
64 Id. at 275.
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The first issue faced by this court was the question of standing.  The government, the 
defendant in this case, argued that the plaintiffs were third parties here, without an injury that 
was personal to them and that could be remedied by the court.65  The plaintiffs were numerous 
and need to be described in order to understand the breadth of interests represented.
The first named plaintiff is “an association of law schools and law faculties”66 called the 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR).  The organization is described as a 
“membership corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey.”67  The district court 
described FAIR as follows:  
Membership is open to law schools, other academic institutions, and faculties that 
vote by a majority to join.  FAIR’s stated mission is ‘to promote academic 
freedom, support educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate 
the rights of institutions of higher education.’  With few exceptions, FAIR 
membership is kept secret.68 (citations omitted)
The second named plaintiff is another organization, the Society of American Law Teachers, 
Inc. (SALT).69  This New York corporation includes a membership of “nearly 900” law school 
faculty members.70  SALT members are committed “to making the legal profession more 
inclusive and to extending the power of the law to underserved individuals and communities.”71
In addition to these two groups, two individual law school professors, Erwin Chemerinsky of 
the University of Southern California Law School and Sylvia Law of the New York University 
65 Id. at 285.
66 Id. at 275.
67 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 274.
70 Id. at 275.
71 Id.
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Law School, are also plaintiffs.72  The faculty organizations and individual professors represent a 
geographically large area, covering the width of the United States.
Finally, there are two student groups and three individual students who have joined as 
plaintiffs.  The student groups include the Coalition for Equality of Boston College Law School 
and the Rutgers Gay and Lesbian Caucus of Rutgers University School of Law.73  The three 
individual students are all from Rutgers.74
The plaintiffs named as defendants six United States department secretaries including 
Defense, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Homeland 
Security.75  The departments all contribute to the grants and federal contracts that spend “billions 
of dollars”76 each year in the country’s many institutions of higher learning.  The Solomon 
Amendment restricts funding from all these departments, not just the Department of Defense.77
This suit was brought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the funding restrictions of the 
Solomon Amendment.78  The plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutional on its face 
“because Congress cannot command law schools even to admit the military to campus” with a 
message that is in conflict with the law schools’ stated mission and goals.79  The plaintiffs also 
72 Id. at 275-76.
73 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77
 10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).
78 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
79 Id. at 297.
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argued the law was unconstitutional as applied by the military.80  According to the law schools, 
the military was requiring “affirmative assistance” that involved an expenditure of resources.81
“Plaintiffs contend that the Solomon Amendment is unconstitutional because 
it (1) conditions a benefit – federal funding – on the surrendering of law schools’ 
First Amendment rights of academic freedom, free speech, and freedom of 
expressive association; (2) discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by promoting 
only a pro-military recruiting message and by punishing only those schools that 
exclude the military because they find the military’s policy against homosexual 
conduct morally objectionable; and (3) violates the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
for lack of clear guidelines and for conferring unbridled discretion on military 
bureaucrats to decide which institutions to target and what acts or omissions 
amount to non-compliance with the statute.”82
At issue was the non-discrimination policy adopted at most accredited American law 
schools.83  The policy includes sexual orientation as a protected category of people.84  The non-
discrimination policy includes law school career placement services and does not allow the 
expenditure of school resources to support the recruiting efforts of employers that discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation.85  The policy does not restrict the students’ freedom to seek 
employment with any employer they may choose, but the students must go to the employers.86
Plaintiffs argue that the Solomon Amendment is unconstitutional on its face and that the 
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 274-75.
83 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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Department of Defense interpretation and enforcement of the statute is unconstitutional as it is 
applied.87
The government moved to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have standing to 
sue.88  First, the government argued that the law schools were not “entitled to bring suit on their 
own behalf and potentially against the wishes of the parent institution.”89  Second, the 
government pointed out that the parent institutions, not the plaintiffs, were in the position to 
make a decision whether or not to comply with the Solomon Amendment.90  Finally, the law 
schools were suing as third-party litigants on behalf of parent universities that had not chosen to 
be part of the suit.91
As an employer, the Department of Defense sends military recruiters to colleges and 
universities all over the country in search of candidates to fill a wide variety of jobs, including 
legal professionals.  The military has a long-standing policy against homosexual activity.92  The 
policy is codified into U.S. law93 and traces a history that reaches back to 1916 when assault with 
intent to commit sodomy became reason for discharge.94  The need for qualified candidates and 
the regulations prohibiting homosexual activity mean that military recruiters are unwelcome at 
law schools that enforce the non-discrimination policy.95  The court in this case held that the 
plaintiffs did have standing.
87 Id. at 297.
88 Id. at 285.
89 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 281; 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (1993).
93
 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2005).
94
 Nat’l Def. Research Inst., RAND, MR-323-OSD, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: Options 
and Assessment 3-4, (1993).
95 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
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The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.96  Plaintiffs had the 
burden of establishing they had a “reasonable likelihood” of success on the merits, that they were 
likely to suffer “irreparable harm” if not granted relief, that the harm they might suffer would be 
greater than the harm to the defendant if the injunction were granted, and that the injunction was 
in the public interest.97
Burt v. Rumsfeld
In Burt v. Rumsfeld the faculty of Yale Law School brought suit against Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld in his official capacity as the Secretary of Defense.98  The faculty consisted of forty-
five faculty members, one of whom chose to represent himself on a slightly different claim.99
The faculty brought suit to enjoin the Department of Defense from enforcing the Solomon 
Amendment.  They argued that the Solomon Amendment and 32 C.F.R. 216.4(c)(3) were 
unconstitutional both on their face and as applied to Yale Law School.100  Further, the plaintiffs 
argued that the “equal access requirement of 32 C.F.R. § 216.4(c)(3) [was] not a reasonable 
interpretation of the Amendment.”101
The Secretary of Defense moved to dismiss the action claiming the faculty lacked 
standing.102  The defense argued that the proper party to the action should have been Yale 
University, not faculty at Yale Law School, because the university would be the party to suffer 
96 Id. at 275.
97 Id. at 296.
98
 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (D. Conn. 2004).
99 Id. at 196.  The faculty members, as a group, based their claim on the assertion that they were forced to 
communicate a significantly different message than they would have chosen.  Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 159.  
Professor Rubenfeld’s argument is “slightly different” from the rest of the faculty.  He claims that law compels him 
to adopt the military’s message as his own. Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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the loss of funding, not the law school faculty.103  A motion to dismiss required the court to 
consider both standing and ripeness.104
The court first applied the three-part test to determine whether the faculty had standing.  The 
test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “(1) an injury in fact; (2) caused by the conduct 
complained of; (3) and that such injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.”105  The court noted that “[t]he defendant [had] not contested redressability”106 and did 
not address that part of the test.
The court found the faculty met the first part of the test, having suffered injury.  The faculty 
was “compelled” to suspend their non-discrimination policy in order to avoid the loss of 
Department of Defense funding to the university.107  The suspension was an impairment of their 
freedom of speech and association.108  This injury was suffered specifically by the faculty.  The 
faculty was responsible for the non-discrimination policy, not the university.109  The faculty had 
decided to apply the policy to “all aspects of law school life” and the compelled suspension of 
the policy was a violation of their free speech right.110
The conduct of the Department of Defense consisted of the threat of loss of federal funding 
that would impact not only Yale Law School but also the other schools in the Yale University 
system.111  The threat by the Department of Defense led directly to the suspension of the law 
103 Id.
104 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
105 Id. at 196 (citing to Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
106 Id. at 197.
107 Id. at 197-98.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 198.
110 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
111 Id. at 199.
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school’s non-discrimination policy.112  The threat was the cause of the injury that the faculty 
suffered.  The court went on to add that even if Yale University were seen as the financially 
injured party, the law school faculty was the constitutionally injured party because it was the law 
school’s non-discrimination policy (as opposed to a University policy) that had been stifled.113
The court next turned to the question of ripeness.  The defendant argued that no decision had 
been made to suspend financial benefits to Yale University or any of its schools, so the claim 
was not ripe for review.114  The court held the question was ripe because the regulation that had 
resulted in injury to the plaintiff was final and was being challenged here.115  The court further 
found that the faculty had suspended the non-discrimination policy on the threat of funding loss 
alone.116  The court held the challenge was ripe because a concrete and ongoing injury had been 
sustained by the faculty that could not be remedied without judicial intervention.117
The court held the plaintiffs had standing and the issue was ripe for review.  As a result, the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied.118  This decision in June, 2004, cleared the way for 
the plaintiffs to pursue their injunction claim.
Having settled the standing and ripeness issue, the plaintiffs in Burt brought their claims 
forward.119  The faculty sought summary judgment on their claims.120  Their first claim was that 
the law school had not violated the Solomon Amendment because recruiting at Yale Law School 
112 Id.
113 Id. at 200 n.2. 
114 Id. at 200.
115 Id. at 201.
116 Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
117 Id. at 203.
118 Id.
119
 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005).
120 Id. at 160.
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took place off-campus.121  The Solomon Amendment only applied to on-campus recruiting so the 
law school had not violated the statute.  The second claim was that even if the law school had 
violated the Solomon Amendment, the law was an unconstitutional condition on a federal 
benefit.122
The court held that the Yale Law School did violate the Solomon Amendment because access 
to the official recruiting programs required employers to comply with the school’s non-
discrimination policy.123  Plaintiffs argued that the military had the same opportunity as any 
other employer who wished to recruit on-campus, all the military had to do was sign the non-
discrimination policy.124  The court refused to equate “opportunity” with access to the school’s 
recruiting program.125  The language of the Solomon Amendment plainly required access that 
was “at least equal in quality and scope”126 to the access provided other recruiters.  The law 
school’s Career Development Office was located on-campus and offered access through its 
official website.127  Those services were not available to military recruiters because they could 
not comply with the non-discrimination policy.  The military was “effectively prevented” 
complete access in violation of the statute.128
The court also held that the Solomon Amendment imposed an unconstitutional condition on 
the faculty of Yale Law School.129  The government argued that the Solomon Amendment was 
121 Id. at 170.
122 Id. at 171.
123 Id. at 173.
124 Id. at 172.
125 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
126
 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2004).
127 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
128 Id. at 173-74.
129 Id. at 175.
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nothing more than the lawful exercise of Congress’ power under the Spending Clause.130  The 
court disagreed that this was a simple exercise of spending authority.  Congress may not use its 
spending authority to coerce or compel a party to forego some other constitutionally guaranteed 
right.131  The court noted that, “the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that, even though a 
person may not be entitled by right to a valuable benefit and ‘even though the government may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the 
government may not rely.’”132  The court found that the faculty had suspended their non-
discrimination policy to prevent the loss of funds to Yale University and the defense conceded 
the suspension was a result of the Solomon Amendment requirements.133  Congressional 
authority under the Spending Clause had exceeded the allowed coercion and turned to 
“compulsion.”134
The compulsion of the Solomon Amendment worked to deny the faculty its right of free 
speech.135  The right of free speech includes not only the right to speak out, but the right to 
remain silent.136  It also includes the right to refrain from speaking for another person or the 
government.137  The government may not compel an individual to aid a third party in 
disseminating a message with which the individual does not agree.138  The faculty had been 
coerced into disseminating the message of the Department of Defense in violation of the 
130 Id. at 174-75.
131 Id. at 175.
132 Id. at 174 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
133 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 179.
136 Id. at 176.
137 Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
138 Id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Calif. 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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faculty’s stated non-discrimination policy.139  The abridgement of the right to free speech 
resulted in an unconstitutional condition that Congress could not impose on the faculty at Yale 
Law School.
In similar fashion, the court found that the faculty was denied its right of free association.  
Using the test the Supreme Court established in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 140 the court 
found the law school faculty was an expressive association whose viewpoint had been 
significantly affected by the government.141  The “key” in Dale was the “substantial” deference 
given to the organization to determine both its message and what would interfere with the 
expression of that message.142  In this case, the faculty had established their message through 
their non-discrimination policy.143  The Solomon Amendment required that the faculty now be 
associated with the message of the Department of Defense, a message with which the faculty 
wished to disassociate.144  This interference had a significant affect on the faculty’s desired 
message that constituted an unconstitutional condition.145
The court applied strict scrutiny to both the free speech and free association rights to 
determine if perhaps the government’s action could be justified.146  Strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate standard because the right at issue is a First Amendment interest.147  The compelling 
139 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
140
 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-58 (2000).
141 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (quoting FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231, the elements are, “1.) whether the group is an 
‘expressive association,’ 2.) whether the [governmental] action at issue significantly affects the group’s ability to 
advocate its viewpoint, and 3.) whether the [government’s] interest justifies the burden it imposes on the group’s 
expressive association.”).
142 Id. at 186.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 186-87.
146 Id. at 179-83, and 187.
147 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (citing Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 19 (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
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state interest, raising and maintaining a military, was not challenged by the plaintiffs and 
assumed by the court.148  The compelling interest, however, must be accomplished by a narrowly 
tailored means.149
SAME v. Rumsfeld
A companion case to Burt v. Rumsfeld was brought by two student organizations of Yale 
Law School.  In  SAME v. Rumsfeld,150 student organizations representing lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender students151 brought suit against the Secretary of Defense.  The two organizations 
were groups called SAME, which stands for Student/Faculty Alliance for Military Equality, and 
Outlaws.152  The plaintiffs in this case argue violations of their First and Fifth Amendment rights 
as a result of the military’s interpretation and application of the Solomon Amendment.153  As in 
the Burt case, the defense moved to dismiss the suit for lack of standing and because the issue 
was not ripe.154
The court addressed four injuries asserted by the plaintiffs.  The claims of the plaintiffs 
included impairment of their First Amendment rights of expressive association, to receive or hear 
the message of another, and to express a particular viewpoint, and a violation of their equal 
protection rights under the Fifth Amendment.155
148 Id.at 180-81, 187.
149 Id. at 181 (citing Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
150
 SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004).
151 Id. at 390.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 391-92.
154 Id. at 392 (standing) and 397 (ripeness).
155 Id. at 391-92.
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The court began its discussion with a brief review of the requirements for standing of 
associations, which includes a greater burden than required of an individual.156  An association 
can sue on behalf of one or more of its members if it can show, “(1) that their members would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) that the interests they seek to protect are 
germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”157  The defense had not 
challenged the standing of the plaintiffs to represent their members.158  The court found that the 
requirements for standing were met by these two associations because any of the individual 
members could also have asserted these claims.159
The court first granted the defense motion to dismiss on the plaintiff claim based on a right of 
expressive association.160  The court held that the law school faculty, a proper party in Burt v. 
Rumsfeld,161 had created and were solely responsible for the law school’s non-discrimination 
policy.162  Neither the students nor the student associations had “an institutional voice” in that 
policy.163  The students were “patrons” of the institution that had created the policy, not 
members, so the student associations could not claim an injury on behalf of the students.164
On the other hand, the court held that the plaintiffs did have a right to receive the message of 
the law school faculty.  The right to express an opinion is pointless unless others have a right to 
156 SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 392-93.
157 Id. at 392 (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
158 Id. at 392-93.
159 Id. at 393.
160 Id. at 394.
161 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005).
162 SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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hear and receive that information.165  Having determined that the faculty had a right to express a 
particular associational preference, the court held that the individual students enjoyed a right to 
receive that message from the faculty.166  The actions of the military in applying the Solomon 
Amendment impaired the students’ right to receive the faculty’s message.  This injury was 
specific to the students and the court denied the defense motion to dismiss based on this claim.167
The next claimed injury was an impairment of the students’ right to express a particular 
viewpoint.  The court held that, like the expressive association claim, the faculty had expressed a 
particular viewpoint through the non-discrimination policy.168  The students asserted that they 
had chosen to come to Yale Law School because of the viewpoint expressed in the non-
discrimination policy.169  The court held that “the mere fact that [the students] agree with the law 
faculty’s viewpoint does not make their own viewpoint the target of the discrimination.”170  The 
defense motion to dismiss was granted on this claim because the plaintiffs were not the injured 
party.171
The last claimed injury was a violation of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.172
The students claim that Congress “singled out gays and lesbians” in passing the Solomon 
Amendment as punishment for those universities that protested the military “Don’t Ask Don’t 
165 Id. (“the right to receive information [is] ‘an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press’ . . . and is a 
necessary ‘predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political 
freedom.’”) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982)).  Id.
166 SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
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Tell” policy.173  The plaintiffs argue that gay and lesbian students have born the full brunt of the 
suspension of the law school’s non-discrimination policy.174  Plaintiffs argue that the 
discrimination against these students that has resulted bears no relation to any legitimate 
governmental objective.175  The court held that this claim was at least sufficient to establish 
standing and the defense motion to dismiss was denied.176
Having found potential injury-in-fact on two of the four claims, the court next addressed 
whether there was a causal link between the claimed injuries and the actions of the military in 
enforcing the statute.  The court held that the Department of Defense’ actions were “fairly 
traceable” to the Yale Law School faculty’s decision to suspend the non-discrimination policy.177
The court held that the suspension of the non-discrimination policy caused both injuries to the 
students; they could no longer receive the non-discrimination message and they had suffered a 
loss of equal protection.178  The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the plaintiffs’ 
claims of a right to receive information and equal protection.179
Finally, the court held that “this matter [was] ripe for adjudication” for the same reasons that 
had been provided in Burt.180  The suspension of the school’s non-discrimination policy was 
173 Id. at 396.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.  The court expressed doubt that this claim would be successful on the merits because the “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell” policy has been held constitutional.  None-the-less, because the argument for standing has a lower threshold, 
this argument was sufficient to establish standing before the court.  Id.
177 SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 397.  The court followed the instruction of the Supreme Court, citing from Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997), in seeking to ensure the injury was “fairly traceable” to the defendant and not 
merely the last step in chain of injury.  The “fairly traceable” standard includes injuries “produced by . . . coercive 
effect upon the action of someone else.”  Id.  Here, the injury to the students could be traced to the military’s 
coercion of Yale Law School in suspending the non-discrimination policy.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 397-98.  See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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effective based on the loss of funding threat alone, and the issue would be no more ripe if the 
Department of Defense took final action against Yale University to cut off funding.  The 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness was denied.181
Burbank v. Rumsfeld
The last federal case in this review is Burbank v. Rumsfeld. 182  In this case, the plaintiffs 
included faculty members, students, and a student organization all of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.183  The claims in this case were very similar to the claims in FAIR, 
Burt, and SAME.  The claims and standing issues were so similar, the court summarized the 
claims of the plaintiffs as “the same types of injuries-in-fact held sufficient to confer standing” 
on the various plaintiffs in those cases, citing each.184  Similarly, the defense made the same 
motions to dismiss for lack of standing.185  This court found no new arguments from either side 
and came to the same holdings as the courts in FAIR, Burt, and SAME.186  The end result was 
that the defense motion to dismiss was denied because the plaintiffs did have standing to sue on 
First Amendment grounds.187  The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was also denied, 
because the court found that there were still issues of fact that remained.188
III. Analysis of Recent Decisions
181 Id.
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 Burbank v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 1925532 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
183 Id. at 1.
184 Id. at 3.
185 Id. at 2.
186 Id. at 3-5.
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188 Burbank, 2004 WL 1925532 at 5.  Given the favorable results for the plaintiffs in FAIR at the 3rd Circuit Court 
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Plaintiffs in the recent litigation have followed similar strategies in attacking the Solomon 
Amendment.  In each case, the plaintiffs claimed First Amendment violations directed at the 
suppression of the non-discrimination policies of the law schools.  The faculties claim to have 
suffered the loss of their freedom to express their opposition to the discriminatory policy of the 
United States military.  The students and student organizations claim to have lost their freedoms 
to express their opposition to the military policies and their freedoms to hear the messages of the 
faculty at the schools where the students attend.  
The FAIR case is the oldest of this series, having begun at the district court level in 2003.  
The District Court for the District of New Jersey held in favor of the government in that case, 
granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  That case was appealed and the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court in 2004.  That reversal meant the plaintiffs 
won their injunction against the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.189  The government 
has appealed and the Supreme Court has agreed to hear this case, but not until the next session 
which begins in October of 2005.190
Litigation of the more recent cases has continued, but may slow until the Supreme Court 
decides FAIR.  As of this writing, the plaintiffs in the Burt case have appealed to the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals.191  Plaintiffs in Burbank have not decided to continue immediately 
189
 Kelly Field, High Court to Hear Case on Military Recruiting, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 13, 
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with an appeal, choosing to wait the pending outcome at the Supreme Court.192  The issues raised 
in FAIR will likely, then, also become dispositive in these other cases.
The New Jersey District Court opinion included a careful discussion of each of the issues, 
which include the intersection of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the spending clause, 
and the first amendment rights of freedom of speech and expressive association.  This analysis 
continues by covering each issue in the order of that opinion and comparing it to the holdings of 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  The recurring disagreement will be what interests to balance 
and the degree of balancing.
Like the funds at issue in the Solomon Amendment, the parties are contesting whose rights 
are more important.  None of the rights mentioned have yet been declared absolute.  There is no 
Congressional right that is absolute under the spending clause.  That is the substance of the 
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions.  Congress has no absolute right to impair or deny rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution by withholding benefits that are otherwise due to an individual or 
an organization.  The Court has given Congress wide latitude under the Spending Clause, but 
there are limits.  Similarly, there is not an absolute right of free speech under the First 
Amendment.  The Court has imbued this crucial freedom with great value and purpose, yet that 
right is not absolute and can be restrained under appropriate circumstances.
The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions states that government may not impose 
conditions on the grant of funds “in order achieve indirectly those regulatory ends that the 
Constitution prohibits it from achieving directly.”193  This doctrine prevents the government 
from, in effect, buying off individual rights.  The rights citizens have acquired through the 
Constitution should not be held hostage to spending power of the government.  Certainly the 
192
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federal government has great spending power and Congress through its powers under the 
Spending Clause can wield great influence, if not coercion.  To protect against the abuse of this 
power, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions makes an assumption about the bargaining 
position of the individual before restricting the power of Congress to influence an individual’s 
behavior.  The doctrine assumes that the individual has some legal or legitimate claim to a right 
that he or she may relinquish.  The right might be an express provision of the Constitution or a 
statutory provision made available to anyone who might qualify by a created set of standards.  
Statutory provision are sometimes referred to as entitlements and should not be withheld from a 
qualifying individual without good cause.  A violation of the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine results when government attempts to force an individual to choose between one of two 
rights, foregoing one in favor of the other.
In their challenge to the Solomon Amendment, the plaintiffs charge that Congress has 
attempted to wrest away their First Amendment rights by denying funding in the form of grants 
and contracts from federal agencies.  Plaintiffs claim Congress is seeking to exchange the law 
schools’ freedoms of speech and expressive association in return for continued funding.  
Certainly the plaintiffs have legal claim to their First Amendment rights.  The issue is whether 
the plaintiffs have relinquished those rights in favor of continued funding.
The difference of opinion between the district court and the circuit court of appeals in FAIR
rests upon whether the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs are absolute.  The circuit court 
implied that the plaintiffs’ rights are absolute and any imposition on those rights will violate the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.194  The district court noted that not even First 
194 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 229 (“[I]f the law schools’ compliance with the Solomon Amendment compromises their First 
Amendment rights, the statute is an unconstitutional condition.”).
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Amendment rights were absolute.195  This basic difference in entering arguments drives the 
conclusions of each court and explains the different outcomes.
The one conclusion both courts agree on is the status of the law schools as expressive 
associations.  The district court relies upon the Court’s three-step process in Dale to analyze a 
group’s expressive association claim.196  The first step in that process is to determine whether a 
group qualifies as an expressive association in order to make a claim of protection under the First 
Amendment.  The law schools meet the de minimus threshold for such an association that 
includes a group that “merely engage[s] in some sort of expression” 197 or no expression at all.198
The district and circuit courts disagree as to whether the Solomon Amendment significantly 
interferes or affects the law schools’ ability to express themselves.  The district court held that 
interference was to be measured in degrees.  Relying on the conclusion that the law schools’ 
right to freedom of expressive association was not absolute, the court held the military recruiters 
were only “periodic” visitors whose presence on the campuses was only incidental.199  The 
district court went further to explain why a military presence was only incidental and did not rise 
to the level of unconstitutionality.  The court described two possible speech violations that could 
significantly interfere with the law schools’ rights, suppression or compulsion.200  Message 
195 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (“Like most freedoms, the right to academic freedom is not absolute.”) and at 303 
(“freedom of expressive association is not absolute.”) (citing Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 
(2000)).
196 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648).
197 Id. (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 655).
198 Id. (citing Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000)).
199 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
200 Id.
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suppression is referred to by the court using the terms “message dilution” and the “muddling of 
the speaker’s message.”201
The court distinguished Dale, holding that the military message of discrimination complained 
of in FAIR could be overwhelmed by the plaintiffs.202  The message of the military would be lost 
in the expression of the law schools, whose message of nondiscrimination and opposition to the 
military policy would come through “loud and clear.”203  The district court also distinguished 
Hurley, which the plaintiffs had relied upon to support their claim of compelled speech.204  The 
military defendants in FAIR did not seek to express a contrary message in recruiting on 
campus.205  In Hurley, the Court struck down an antidiscrimination law that the plaintiffs in that 
case had relied upon to force their inclusion in a parade.206  The message of the military, if one 
could be found, is not necessarily consistent with the message of the law schools, but does not 
significantly interfere with the law schools’ freedom of expression.
The circuit court relied solely upon Dale and held that the law schools’ freedom of 
expression was significantly affected only because the law schools so asserted.207  The circuit 
court ended its analysis of the plaintiffs as expressive association here.  In Dale, the Supreme 
Court gave deference to the Boy Scouts of America to determine what expression it would assert 
and what would impair that expression.208  The Court further held, however, that an expressive 
association could not “erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that 
201 Id. at 305.
202 Id. at 305-06.
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mere acceptance of a member form a particular group would impair its message.”209  According 
to the circuit court, FAIR is to be given all deference, upon its assertion alone, that its message is 
impaired.  The Dale Court, though, should not be understood to equate deference with 
capitulation and the circuit court’s omission of any discussion of tempered deference subjects it 
to possible reversal on review.
The district court’s holding that the law schools’ rights are not significantly impaired results 
in another level of analysis, standard of scrutiny.  FAIR argued that the court should apply strict 
scrutiny; a fundamental right such as the freedom of speech rights implicated here normally 
would require strict scrutiny.210  The district court relied upon the standards set out in Dale and 
held that strict scrutiny applied where government action directly burdened expression.211  The 
law schools were not so burdened.  The Solomon Amendment was not aimed at any particular 
expression, only indirectly burdening the law schools.  The burden on the law schools was 
created, arguably, by their own expression of the non-discrimination policies.  The alternative to 
a rigorous standard of scrutiny is that standard adopted when governmental action results in an 
indirect burden on expression, or where the burden is incidental.212  The district court applied the 
standards indicated by O’Brien.213  O’Brien burned his draft card and challenged his prosecution 
as an unconstitutional restriction on his freedom of symbolic speech.214  The Court held the 
incidental burden on O’Brien’s free speech rights were justified by the government’s substantial 
209 Id.
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211 Id.
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interests in lawful conscription and the narrow tailoring of a law which had an incidental impact 
on noncommunicative conduct.215
The standards of O’Brien permit a governmental restriction “if [that restriction] is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”216  The district court in FAIR found the government interest in 
raising and supporting an army and navy were both within the power of the government and a 
substantial and important interest.217  The court also found the Solomon Amendment did not 
target speech.  The statute did not deny funds based on any particular viewpoint, especially one 
created by the school, but funds were denied based on the conduct of any school which denied 
access to military recruiters.218  Finally, the court noted that narrow tailoring was not required 
under the lower standard of intermediate scrutiny and this law was reasonable in furthering the 
interest of Congress in raising an army and a navy.219
The circuit court applied strict scrutiny and sharply disagreed with the district court that the 
tests of O’Brien should be applied.220  The circuit court would never have reached the O’Brien
tests, concluding that those tests were not necessary when the speaker is protected on other First 
Amendment grounds.221  FAIR was protected by the First Amendment as an expressive 
association and against compelled speech and the majority opinion would suggest that these 
215 Id. at 382.
216 Id. at 377.
217 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312-313.
218 Id. at 314.
219 Id. at 313 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)).
220 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 243.
221 Id. at 243-44.
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protections are more than sufficient to protect the law schools’ act of denying access to military 
recruiters.  This circuit court position seems to be in direct opposition to the original holding in 
O’Brien, however.
The circuit court argues that because the law schools have made a verbal or written 
expression in the form of a non-discrimination policy, their conduct in preventing military 
recruiter access to campuses is also protected.  The expression and the conduct were separated by 
the Court in O’Brien and are likely to be separated in this instance as well.  The O’Brien holding 
does not seek to suppress the freedom of expression, but acts or conduct contrary to legitimate 
governmental operation should not be permitted as obstacles to the general welfare and defense.  
In this case, the law schools are free to oppose any military policy or governmental action they 
wish, but they should not obstruct the legitimate operation of the federal government in the 
course of that expression.  Congress is required to raise and maintain an army and recruiting is a 
necessary and legitimate function to meet that mandate.  The Supreme Court is unlikely to 
overturn O’Brien on these facts where conduct can be separated from expression.
As is so often the case, entering assumptions have driven the results in the opinions 
surrounding the Solomon Amendment.  The dissent in the circuit court decision emphasized that 
the court there should have opened with the assumption that all acts of Congress are 
constitutional.222  Had the majority begun with the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, 
the law schools would have the burden of demonstrating first that their expressions of non-
discrimination were actually violated by the presence of military recruiters.223  If the law schools 
could make that connection, then, and only then, the court would have been correct to reach a 
First Amendment question in deciding whether the freedom of speech rights should “trump” the 
222 Id. at 248 (J. Aldisert, dissenting).
223 Id. at 247 (J. Aldisert, dissenting).
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Article I duties of Congress with respect to raising and maintaining military forces.224  The 
dissent reaches the conclusion that the lawful acts of Congress in securing military enlistments is 
not properly impeded by the willful conduct of the plaintiffs based on perceived injustices in the 
otherwise lawful policies of the executive branch of the federal government.  This conclusion is 
especially true of a statute that is not directed at any particular viewpoint of suppression of any 
particular viewpoint.225
None of the recently litigated decisions have reviewed the status of recruitment as 
commercial speech.  The Nomi court held in 1992 that commercial speech did not enjoy all the 
protections of other types of political speech protected by the First Amendment.226  The court 
expressly held that recruitment is commercial speech.227  The test for commercial speech is 
“whether the speech proposes a commercial transaction.”228  There seems to have been an
assumption in the current litigation that the non-discrimination policies are fully protected 
political speech.  The law school policies, however, are directed at potential employers and 
recruiters.229  The policies are directed toward who may recruit and how that recruitment is to be 
carried out at the individual campuses.  It was the law school in Nomi that argued that even “the 
military must compete in the commercial marketplace.”230  The purpose of the law schools’ non-
discrimination policies in the current litigation is drenched in the commercial transaction of 
employment.  If this language is assumed to meet the commercial standards of Nomi, then the 
224 Id. at 247 (J. Aldisert, dissenting).
225 Id. at 262 (J. Aldisert, dissenting).
226 Nomi, 796 F. Supp. 412 (Minn. 1992), vacated as moot, 5 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 1993).
227 Id. at 417.
228 Id.
229 See e.g., FAIR, 390 F.3d at 225 (describing typical language of a non-discrimination policy).
230 Nomi, 796 F. Supp. at 416.
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protections claimed under the First Amendment are not to be given the strict scrutiny treatment 
required by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
These foregoing assumptions are all likely to be reviewed by the Court when it hears the 
FAIR appeal in the 2005-2006 session.  In the interim, Congress has reiterated its support for the 
Solomon Amendment.  In February 2005, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution 
59, expressing continued support “for equal access of military recruiters to institutions of higher 
education.”231  The debate over military policy regarding homosexuals in uniform is not likely to
be settled by the success or failure of the Solomon Amendment.232  The Court is likely to review 
the Solomon Amendment for its value to the stated purpose of military recruiting.  Facially, the 
statute does not purport any viewpoint except support for the military’s end-strength goals and 
the position of Congress that tax dollars should be spent where there is the greatest cooperation 
with the nation’s needs for a quality self-defense force.  If the Court begins with the assumptions 
of constitutionality and the compelling interests of Congress compared to the lesser protected 
rights for commercial speech, the Solomon Amendment is likely to be upheld.
IV. Impact
A. Schools
If the Solomon Amendment is upheld, the law schools do not have give up their policies; and 
they should not.  For schools that feel as strongly as the plaintiff schools in the current litigation, 
a public statement in the form of school policy sends the strong message that is politically 
231
 151 Cong. Rec. H310-01, H310.
232
 Several commentators have discussed the advisability of the military policy.  See e.g.,  Eugene E. Baime, Major, 
U.S. Army, Private Consensual Sodomy should be Constitutionally Protected in the Military by the Right to 
Privacy, 171 MIL. L. REV. 91 (2002); Debra A. Luker, Comment, The Homosexual Law and Policy in the Military: 
“Don’t Ask, Don’ Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass” . . . Don’t be Absurd!, 3 SCHOLAR 267 (2001); Jeffrey S. 
Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical, and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REV. 55 
(1991).  See also, Nat’l Def. Research Inst., RAND, MR-323-OSD, Sexual Orientation and the U.S. Military 
Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment (1993).
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protected speech.  Under the Solomon Amendment, the schools still have options with regard to 
career placement.  Namely, the schools that so desire may choose not to provide any recruitment 
or career services on campus.  The military would not be excluded or treated any differently than 
other employers where no recruiting takes place.  Instead, the likely outcome is that many of 
these schools will choose to contract out their career placement to professional employment 
companies.  There are several beneficial outcomes for the schools in this option.  First, the 
school is free to find the most successful and prestigious employment companies to continue to 
attract the best possible students.  In a free market system, the best firms and companies will 
compete to hire graduates from the law schools.  Second, the law schools will no longer incur the 
expenses of staff and space that career placement offices occupy.  That savings can be returned 
to the schools for other purposes.  Third, it is possible that some contracts with employment 
companies might include commissions back to the schools for strong placement candidates.  
Since placement firms earn commissions from the eventual hiring employers, the law schools 
might be able to encourage the contracting placement firms to split those commissions for 
providing strong graduates.  Finally, under contract situations, the law schools may provide more 
than the information the Solomon Amendment requires be made available to the military 
recruiters.  Under the current law, the law schools will continue to be required to provide military 
recruiters basic information on the current enrollment such as name and contact information.  If 
no other information is released to other potential employers, the schools will not be in violation 
of the law by releasing only the minimum required by the Solomon Amendment.  The law 
schools need only advise and encourage their students that career placement services are 
provided by a placement firm and step out of the Solomon Amendment fray.
A. Government
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The Solomon Amendment is unquestionably a values statement of Congress.  Representative 
Solomon’s frustration with the opposition of some institutions of higher education to the military 
or military policies was not a new frustration in 1994.  Congress had dealt with public animosity 
toward the military policy during the late Vietnam era of the late 1960s and early 1970s.  If 
anything, Representative Solomon can be commended for his restraint in not attempting to force 
recruiting on colleges and universities.  The Spending Clause is a gentler way to persuade
schools to assist the government where they can while providing breathing room to make their 
objections known.  Not all schools will take advantage of the restraint embodied in the Solomon 
Amendment.  Where that is true, Congress would do well to shift some of its focus to other 
productive programs that have supported governmental intentions.
Many schools do support the military recruitment purpose of the Solomon Amendment and 
Congress could do more to support them.  Specifically, Congress should implement a program of 
support for cooperating schools modeled on the small business and minority business programs 
that garner many federal contracts.  The military will not stop gathering information on which 
schools are the most productive recruiting grounds.  Congress should take a more active role in 
reviewing and using this information to create a preference program.  The Department of 
Defense should be directed to grow these relationships through the same grants and contracts 
now provided to traditional large schools that are not always as cooperative.  Smaller schools 
should be encouraged to support the military and be rewarded for that support.  Larger schools 
that are not cooperative with the purposes of Congress should expect to be seen as poor business 
partners with the government and lose their contracts.
The military should consider its recruiting program.  The overhead of recruiting programs 
may not be an appropriate mission of the military.  The federal government already has an Office 
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of Personnel Management.  Perhaps the economies of scale of the federal government would be 
best put to use in a single administrative office.  If all executive branch recruiting were handled 
by a single federal agency, the military might avoid some of the animosity it now endures on the 
nation’s school campuses.  Military recruiters could be detailed to the single agency for 
discussions with potential candidates, but more of the field work could be done by government 
recruiters in civilian attire to attract interested individuals to central, neutral locations to discuss 
the myriad of options available in government employment.  The cost savings to the military 
should be substantial and the benefit to the potential employee is the chance to learn of work that 
might not have ever occurred to him or her.
V. Conclusion
Military recruiting is problematic, especially in times of conflict.  The Solomon Amendment 
was a fair attempt by Congress to encourage schools to cooperate with the government in 
meeting a task mandated to Congress by the Constitution.  The First Amendment rights of the 
nation’s schools are not violated where their message is only incidentally impacted by 
government action.  The Solomon Amendment should be upheld by the Supreme Court.
